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For General Romeo Dallaire, whose valiant stand with 500 of his men saved the lives of 
countless innocents in Kigali, Rwanda, 1994.  
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 Jean Kambanda sat quietly. The handsome forty-year old African was dressed in 
his familiar dark blue jacket and azure grey tie. His hands were folded in a gesture 
which, if not for the severity of the proceeding, might have been mistaken for 
indifference. Behind plain black eyeglasses and an immaculate beard, his soft eyes 
looked out with a professorial intensity. Legs crossed and reclining in his chair, he 
looked more bemused than concerned. Indeed, he could have been lightly chiding a 
young subordinate, or engrossed in an abstruse problem. There was an unmistakable air 
of eloquence and dignity in his movements…a painful and tragic élan.  
 
 Jean Kambanda sat quietly in his chair, relaxed. 
 
 He waited to hear his sentence for the genocide of 800,000 of his people… 
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 Since it’s inception, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has 
sought retribution for the victims of the Rwandan genocide. Throughout Africa and on 
three continents, the ICTR searches for heads of government, soldiers, and state officials 
who oversaw the worst genocide since Pol Pot’s Cambodia. Like Javert’s pursuit of Jean 
Valjean, one man was foremost in their mind. The sole person at the helm of Rwanda’s 
government during the horrific genocide of 1994. During his tenure, in the short span of 
four months, over 800,000 men, women, and children were systematically and efficiently 
exterminated. Death camps were revived and churches were burnt down upon the heads 
of parishioners. Mass rape and the ex utero, a crime so deplorable that it was last 
practiced upon Native Americans at Sand Creek, once again bloodied the Rwandan 
landscape. When this bloodshed finally waned, to the shock of the international 
community, the man quietly disappeared. He was Jean Kambanda, the Prime Minister of 
Rwanda.  
 
 On the 9th of July in 1997, three years after the genocide, Jean Kambanda’s 
haunted past returned with a vengeance. Following a seven week marathon stakeout 
involving shadowy U.S. forces, Kenyan police and United Nations ICTR investigators, 
over sixty armed men descended upon Nairobi in the dawn light, arresting Jean 
Kambanda and six of his entourage in “Operation NIKI” (Nairobi-Kaligi), seven hundred 
kilometers and two countries distant from Rwanda. Five days later, Kambanda was 
transferred to the secure United Nations Detention facility in Arusha, Rwanda, there to 
wait almost three months before the ICTR Prosecution team could prepare an indictment 
against him.  
 
 On the 10th of October, ICTR document 97-23-I was confirmed by Judge Yakov 
Ostrovsky. Kambanda was now to be held before the ICTR to answer for four of the most 
serious international crimes; genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, complicity, and 
crimes against humanity. Operation NIKI was a success.   
 
 Born in 1955 in the heart of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda is perhaps the most unlikely 
genocidal dictator in modern history. Perpetually seen with a swarthy Quaker like beard 
in archaic black plastic glasses, and a camoflauge jacket out of place with his urban chic 
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attire, Kambanda seemed a part, but not the whole of the violent government. A father of 
two children, Kambanda holds a degree in commercial engineering (banking) and began 
his career as a banker in the Union des Banques Populaires du Rwanda (The BPR, a 
Rwandan equivilant to the Bank of America). Proving highly skilled in this innocuous 
fiscal talent, Kambanda rose to chair the BPR, making him an influential, but by no 
means politically central figure. Never in the military, and without any formal political 
training, the height of Kambanda’s political activity was his position as Vice-President of 
the Butare section of the Mouvement Democratique Republique (MDR), the Tutsi ruling 
party responsible for the genocidal atrocities.  In this capacity, Kambanda’s power might 
have been greater then it seemed. Though Butare is not the capital of the monarchy, it is 
certainly the richest city in Rwanda, home to the National University, and is the ancient 
capital of the Rwandan monarchy.  
  
 Following the assassination of the Prime Minister Agathe Uwiliyingimana in 
April 1994,i Kambanda seemed to leapfrog several senior heads of the MDR 
administration. Within days Kambanda was appointed the head of the Interim 
Government of Rwanda, an institution similar to Vichy France which immediately 
sanctioned the on-going massacres,  and began devising new methods of ethnic cleansing. 
Kambanda was whisked to the “Ecole Supeirieot Militaire” and “informed” of his 
nomination.ii Perpetually surrounded by a vanguard of Rwandan security forces, the 
formally quiet Kambanda proved a political natural…strumming up the youth militia and 
openly aggravating an already dangerous situation.  
 
 It was Jean Kambanda who masterminded the horrific three month Tutsi genocide 
of 1994 and ordered the holocaust in the Tutsi sanctuary of the Church of St. Jean. It was 
Kambanda who drew upon the vitality of the Interahamwe, an emotionally charged youth 
militia modeled after the Nazi Youth Corps. It was Kambanda’s voice which soon echoed 
throughout the land on Radio Television Mille Libres, inciting ethnic violence and hatred. 
And it was Kambanda’s bastion of history, intelligence, and popularity in Butare which 
proved decisive in the oncoming bloodshed.  
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 And then…almost as quickly, Jean Kambanda vanished. Following the fortunate 
take over of Kigali by the war hardened RPF guerillas (the last bastion of moderate arms 
in Rwanda), the genocidal administration fled. Many first-world nations, Kenya and 
Cameroon among them, undoubtedly played host to their unwelcome and unknown 
visitors. Just as the upper echelon of Nazi leaders had fled in the aftermath of World War 
II, the vast body of leaders, scholars and soldiers responsible for the genocide left 
Rwanda, vanishing amidst the millions of refugees.  
 
  This paper is an epilogue of the story of Jean Kambanda. As first and foremost a 
legal discussion, it analyzes whether Kambanda’s right to counsel was violated. In this 
regard, this paper compares the provisions of the right to counsel in the United States, 
and the ICTR. Secondly, as a critical essay, this paper queries whether Jean Kambanda’s 
conviction was a result of political expediency. Was Kambanda immolated in the pyre of 
international relations, a sacrificial lamb to repair the waning power and legitimacy of the 
ICTR ? Finally, as a historical narrative, this paper is an analysis of the inconsistencies 
which plagued the International Criminal Tribunal from his arrest in Nairobi, till the 
passionate argument of his final counsel in the Appeals chamber of Judge Claude Jorda.  
 
 Prior to this layman’s project, the aforementioned questions were, throughout 
Kambanda’s appeal, thrown back and forth in academic literature like a dancer’s pas de 
deux. That was almost four and a half years ago. Today, as the ICTR begins the process 
of finalizing it’s case load and preparing a termination strategy, the story of Jean 
Kambanda is largely forgotten. No images of his face, nor press releases proclaiming his 
innocence are published. His image no longer adorns the billboards in Rwanda, and 
crowds do not protest outside the ICTR anymore. One wonders if these questions are 
thought of at all.  
 
 Alone with his thoughts, Jean Kambanda has had seven years, six days, and 
sixteen hours to think about them.  
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2. The Right to Counsel in the United States. 
 
a.  History.  
 
 In the United States of America, the Constitution guarantees the right to counsel 
through the Fifth, Sixth Amendments, and Fourteenth Amendments. Yet the modern right  
to counsel is an outgrowth of interpretation, and not a result of substantive provisions. 
The layman citizen may erroneously believe that for every criminal defendant, an 
attorney must be appointed or provided. Strictly speaking, the Constitution guarantees no 
such right. The constitutional right to counsel is only a fallback provision…a legal 
failsafe which historically intended to prevent only the most egregious “railroading” of a 
criminal proceeding strictly within the federal system. The words of the Sixth amendment 
actually refer to counsel almost in passing, and are the only mention of counsel anywhere 
in the Constitution.  
 
 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
 impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
 shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
 accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
 obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense 
 
 
 The right to counsel as we know it was not always so. The positive right to 
counsel truly emerged in the post-Gideon era of the early 1960’s, following the landmark 
case of Gideon v. Wainwright,iv and it’s later Juvenile corollary, In Re Gault.v Heretofore, 
felony adult counsel was only constitutionally mandated in the much smaller Federal 
system through the strictest interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.vi As late as the 
1930’s, counsel was regularly being denied in capital cases,vii and virtually non-existent 
to state indigent defendants.viii In 1942 the infamous Betts v. Brady case, in which Smith 
Betts was charged, tried, and convicted of robbery without assistance of counsel, was 
affirmed by the US Supreme Court. ix  For a time, Betts halted the preliminary forays into 
a Constitutionally mandated right to counsel.x  
 
 Some twenty years later, Clarence Gideon broke into a ramshackle pool hall in 
Panama City, whose owner, by an odd quirk of fate, was named Strickland.xi Convicted 
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without counsel, Gideon brought a writ in forma pauperis to the US Supreme Court, 
eventuating the now famous Gideon v. Wainwright decision. Under the masterful 
advocacy of Abe Fortas, whom Deputy Attorney General Bruce Jacob, then a very 
youthful twenty-seven year old, referred to as both “grave” and “charming”, Gideon 
eviscerated the Betts decision, creating a de facto right to counsel in state felony cases, 
and by implication all capital cases throughout the nation.xii  
 
 From the rationale applied in Gideon v. Wainwright, it was but a legal stones-
throw away to the modern-day doctrine of Argersinger v. Hamlin.xiii Indeed, as stated in 
Argersinger, the United States Supreme Court had already incorporated more and more 
of the 6th Amendment through the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause.xiv Five years 
after Gideon, the court held in Duncan v. Louisiana, that a jury-trial was fundamental to 
Due Process under the 6th Amendment.xv Duncan,  a young black teen had received two 
months in prison for “slapping” a white teenager on the elbow in a short and perfunctory 
bench trial.xvi A year before, in Washington v. Texas, the Court had struck down a 
Washington statute forbidding a Criminal defendant to cross-examine his co-conspirators 
as invalid under the Confrontation Clause.xvii Little was left of the 6th amendment to 
incorporate except of course, the bulk of the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases. 
 
 In 1972, just nine years after Gideon v. Wainwright, Justice Douglas wrote in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin that;   
 
 …absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any 
 offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was 
 represented by counsel at his trial.xviii 

 Jon Argersinger, an indigent of Leon County, Florida had actually not received a 
sentence of imprisonment per se, but a $500 dollar fine with the key provision that upon 
default, he was to be held for six months in custody.xix Being indigent, he could not 
afford and attorney and of course, could not afford to pay the fine. As a result, 
Argersinger was immediately placed into custody. Roughly eight days after he was 
arrested, Argersinger’s Public Defender submitted a Habeas Corpus brief to the Supreme 
Court of Florida which, surprisingly, was immediately disposed of and resulted in his 
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release on bond. However, following a negative opinion three months later, the now 
thoroughly confused Argersinger was remanded into custody.  
 
 The opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Argersinger was slightly 
problematic. While critical of the lack of counsel and lauded by the defense bar, it also 
left the door open to exceptions in the instances of fine, acquittal, or non-custodial 
sentencing.xx The end result was that Argersinger required that counsel be appointed in 
the vast majority of misdemeanor cases where imprisonment was in fact sought, or 
practically, possible.xxi Should a prosecutor seek imprisonment, the accused MUST have 
a counsel or a successful trial would be for naught. Should he actually receive 
imprisonment, counsel was undeniable. The court would earmark this rationale in Scott v. 
Illinois, as the basic moyens vivre for right to counsel jurisprudence.xxii Counsel in 
felonies and capital cases counsel continued to be automatic.xxiii In misdemeanors, should 
imprisonment occur counsel must have been supplied.xxiv The basic framework of this 
rule, in it’s entirety has not changed drastically in the past three decades.  
 
 
b. Philosophy and Key Provisions of the American Right to Counsel.  
   
 Attorneys, lawyers, or their counterparts, have existed since the early fifth century 
B.C.xxv The notion that all who desire it may have someone more versed or eloquent 
speak on their behalf is a concept which dates centuries before Christ, and is even 
paralleled in the Old Testament. God himself was fond of attorneys it seemed, as he 
instructed Moses to defer his own rather inadequate public speaking to his more 
loquacious relative Aaron.xxvi However while the concept of “counsel” pervaded Western 
thought since the time of Pliny, the natural corollary of “appointed counsel” is a 
relatively new and amorphous philosophical concept. Indeed, in Ancient Greece, the 
opposite was true. Every Greek citizen was both a policeman and a prosecutor, and the 
arrester was also required to prosecute the case.xxvii  
 
 In the United States, the right to counsel is by no means static, and is limited by 
American case law. Two forms of counsel right exist. The primary doctrine under the 
sixth amendment requires counsel to be present at any “critical stage” of a criminal 
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proceeding, and upon the commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings.xxviii Though 
offense-specific,xxix the Sixth Amendment right to counsel stems directly from the words 
of the Constitution itself and operates in a variety of circumstances. Within the context of 
a “critical stage” judicial proceedings are irrelevant. For instance, in Escobedo v. Illinois, 
the Supreme Court held that where a murder suspect was arrested, brought to a police 
station, denied access to his lawyer and his lawyer’s requests to see his client were 
studiously ignored, a Sixth amendment violation occurred, despite the lack of an actual 
indictment.xxx Vice versa, the Sixth Amendment also creates a threshold at the 
commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings. This concept of “attachment” 
discussed in Kirby v. Illinois,xxxi creates an mandatory attorney threshold after which 
Counsel must be present or appointed.xxxii Following the indictment of a criminal 
defendant, one must have counsel.xxxiii By the same token, following the termination of 
adversarial judicial proceedings theoretically counsel may no longer required, leading 
many academics to raise the question of whether parole hearing counsel is actually 
Constitutionally mandated.xxxiv The more immediate question of appellate counsel has 
already been addressed. In Douglas v. California, the Supreme Court held that indigent 
defendants have an absolute right to an appellate counsel in the first instance,xxxv yet their 
opinion did not touch upon the more complex problem of an indigent’s infinite right to 
appellate counsel. In any event the Sixth amendment right is a two-pronged positivist 
approach to attorneys. An indigent is entitled to counsel in any of two circumstances, first 
upon the commencement of an indictment, and secondly at any critical stage of the 
proceedings.  
 
 The second doctrine of counsel under the Fifth Amendment, is a prophylactic, or 
a protective and preventive rule.xxxvi The famous Miranda v. Arizona decision draws 
upon the due process imperatives of the 5th amendment right against self-
incrimination.xxxvii Under the Miranda rule, the Fifth Amendment bars any evidence from 
“custodial interrogation” after an accused has been denied access to his attorney, or has 
failed to be informed of his Miranda right to counsel.xxxviii However, it operates only in 
extremely limited circumstances, and frequently succumbs to the very nature of police 
expediency. For instance, where police officers had arrested a suspect, and began 
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(innocently?) to discuss the horrific dangers of leaving a loaded firearm within reach of a 
nearby school for disabled children, followed by the previously intransigent suspect 
confessing to the location of a shotgun, the Supreme Court held that this was not an 
“interrogation”, despite it’s obvious ulterior motives.xxxix   
 
 The fifth and sixth amendment may operate independently, simultaneously, or not 
at all through a client’s waiver. The crux of these rights is that at certain pre-adjudicative 
stages counsel may be present, namely custodial interrogation. However practically, 
Miranda is an ex post facto rule. It operates as an exclusionary rule after a constitutional 
violation has occurred. Indeed, it would be a strange police officer who volunteered to 
halt the interrogation and continue while counsel is present. 
 
 The Philosophical rationale behind the right to counsel has been touched upon 
mainly by the courts. The general consensus is that society is not willing to bear the costs 
to legitimacy and fairness resulting from a lack of counsel.xl While judicially and 
politically expedient, the right to counsel is described as “fundamental” to our legal 
system.xli Put another way, in the short run counsel could be sacrificed in terms of 
expediency, but the long lasting effects upon the legitimacy and infrastructure of the 
judiciary would be irreparable and disastrous.xlii In France and Germany, this rationale 
has been described as a simultaneous public interest to ensure that the legitimacy of the 
legal system is sacrosanct.xliii In the economic sense, this public interest in legitimacy 
coincides with the defendant’s interest to have a fair trial, in the same way a ship 
captain’s interest in a lighthouse coincides with a seaport’s interest in uninterrupted trade.  
 
 Philosophical rationales from the international perspective are scarce in academic 
literature. It is somewhat difficult for Americans to comprehend that in the vast majority 
of the world counsel is not provided, or differs from the United States defense counsel 
paradigm. In Europe, counsel was being provided some time before Gideon was born.xliv 
In many circumstances, foreign legal systems without transpositions of the American 
counsel right function, albeit with a more Draconian overtones, rather expediently.xlv It is 
also difficult for Western scholars to understand that in many nations and cultures, 
criticism of the indigenous legal system (which in many instances predates the United 
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States in general by several centuries), is considered bad form.xlvi China’s legal system, 
for example, bears strong relationship to the Ancient Tang Legal Code, an era of Chinese 
history which is viewed with great pride and reverence.xlvii In France, the judge may 
routinely step into the role of counsel and examine a witness, or conduct independent 
investigations.xlviii In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a nation with  “most-favored nation 
status”, there actually is no counsel system at all, and the courts are based upon the 
ancient Islamic sharia’a tribunal.xlix Vice versa in France and Germany, the wish of the 
defendant to proceed pro persona, is irrelevant. A defendant is not only appointed but 
required to have an attorney in his criminal proceeding.l  
 
 This brief diatribe describes some of the inherent problems in comparing the right 
to counsel. However comparison by itself is always helpful…as it allows the researcher 
to better understand his own system, as well as another. The adage of Nosce te ipsum, 
Know Thyself, coined by the famous lawyer Socrates,li refers not to self-awareness but to 
understanding of others, and indeed, a cavalier disdain for oneself. This is the essence of 
comparativism, not without a certain tragic irony that Socrates himself, was convicted 
and sentenced to death pro per.  
 
3. The Right to Counsel in the ICTR. 
 
a.  Substantive Provisions. 
 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is governed by a statute enacted 
under the auspices of Security Council Resolution 955 in 1994.lii This statute, in addition 
to laying out the general order of the Tribunal and it’s mission, guarantees the right of 
counsel under Article 20(4)(d).liii The relevant language of this article states; 
 
 4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present 
 Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full 
 equality:… 
 …(d)To be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person 
 or through legal assistance of his or her own choosing; to be informed, if he or 
 she does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance 
 assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and 
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 without payment by him or her in any such case if he or she does not have 
 sufficient means to pay for it;liv 
 
 The right to counsel is also supplemented through Article 2 of the “Directive on 
the Assignment of Defense Counsel”,lv in a codification similar to the United States 
Miranda rule. However unlike Miranda, Article 2 applies to any person detained upon the 
authority of the Tribunal. The detainee need not be an accused, but may also be merely a 
suspect of an investigation, or even a potential witness.lvi Article 2 is a sweeping rule 
reaching beyond the Miranda doctrine, and allows counsel in myriad situations involving 
police or prosecutor interrogations. The actual language of Article 2 reads as follows;  
 (A) Without prejudice to the right of an accused to conduct his own Defence, a 
 suspect who is to be questioned by the Prosecutor during an investigation and an 
 accused upon whom personal service of the indictment has been effected shall 
 have the right to be assisted by Counsel provided that he has not expressly waived 
 his right to Counsel. 
 (B) Any person detained on the authority of the Tribunal, including any person 
 detained in accordance with Rule 90 bis, also has the right to be assisted by 
 Counsel provided that the person has not expressly waived his right to Counsel. 
 (C)  All references in this Directive to suspects or accused shall also be 
 understood to apply to any persons detained on the authority of the Tribunal.lvii 
  
 Finally, Rule 65 of the “Rules Covering Detention of Persons Awaiting Trial or 
Appeal” specifically delineates the absolute right to have contact with counsel while 
incarcerated.lviii Like similar provisions in United States state prisons, and particularly the 
federal regulatory code relating to the right of counsel within the federal prison system,lix 
Rule 65 grasps the fundamental principle that access to counsel within detention is just as 
paramount as access in a court setting.  
b. In Practice. 
 ‘Legal assistance’, obviously refers to the assistance of a competent general 
counsel versed in international or domestic criminal defense. However certain 
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implications arise in the context of the ICTR not paralleled in domestic case law. The 
traditional requirement of admission to a state bar would seem woefully inadequate 
within the context of a genocide trial. At least in the United States, all lawyers duly 
admitted to the bar are deemed to have the requisite knowledge, or be able to attain the 
requisite knowledge, to litigate any potential case.lx The ICTR, of course, differs in this 
assessment. Like an attorney who owes a duty of candor both to his client and the court, 
the ICTR has dual duties to the people of Rwanda, as well as the defendants before it’s 
auspices.lxi In response the ICTR has implemented several procedures ensuring that 
appointed counsel is adequately trained to litigate on an indigent’s behalf.  
 Article 13 of the Directive on Defense Counsel requires that appointed counsel be 
duly admitted to a bar for at least 10 years, speak either English or French (in most cases 
it behooves the attorney to speak both in addition to Kinyarwande and Swahili), and 
appear before the Tribunal prior to appointment.lxii Form IL2, utilized as the preliminary 
screening for defense counsel by the Office of the Registrar, also requires the counsel-to-
be to list his relevant experience in Criminal Law, International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights.lxiii 
 The process for being called to the bar of the International Tribunal is actually 
relatively simple. Counsel submits his Form IL2 and supporting documents, which, if 
found sufficient, are accepted by the ICTR Registry. From there his name, curriculum 
vitae, expertise and nationality are placed on a Defense Counsel list. This list of various 
Defense counsel represents the major legal systems of the world.lxiv Additionally, the list 
also comprises both Practitioners in International law, domestic criminal defense lawyers, 
local attorneys, and academics. The defendant selects his counsel from the list and 
forwards this information to the Registrar. At that point the Registrar may appoint an 
indigent defendant’s selected counsel, deny him the right to counsel, or appoint him a 
temporary counsel for one month. However, as stated by United Nations Press Release, 
several inconsistencies arise. Foremost is the fact that an organ of the court is selecting an 
accused counsel for him, creating a rarely publicized conflict of interest. Secondly, the 
Registrar of the ICTR is under orders to assign counsel prudently with regard to cost !lxv  
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 Cost is an interesting issue in and of itself. The ICTR Registry has been quoted as 
budgeting an approximate total of 5 million dollars for defense counsel fees.lxvi By 
comparison, Professor Richard Dieter of the Death Penalty Information Center has 
testified that in Texas, it costs approximately 2.3 million dollars to run a capital case,lxvii  
and in at least one case, the costs of mounting a favorable capital defense reached 2.9 
million dollars.lxviii Obviously the ICTR is not Texas, but a much more complex forum. 
The inadequacies of 5 million dollars are obvious and striking.  
 In practice the assigned counsel system has led to substantial confusion. The most 
publicized and embarrassing occurrence took place when the astoundingly inept Court 
Administrator Dr. Agwu Okali, in a botched attempt to geographically balance the 
Defense Counsel list, placed an arbitrary moratorium upon French and Canadian 
lawyers.lxix Dr. Okali of course overlooked the fact that both countries happen to be the 
largest French speaking nations in the world.lxx This startling unilateral advance of 
geopolitical Affirmative Action by Dr. Okali was described by Professor David Tolbert, 
the former Chef de Cabinet to the President of the ICTY and his senior legal advisor, as 
both “arbitrary” and “nonsense”.lxxi  
 This situation reached a head following a detainee hunger strike led by former 
teacher and bourgmestre Jean Paul Akeyasu.lxxii In response, (and not a little bit 
abashedly) Dr. Okali, bowing to both internal and international pressure, ceased his 
moratorium. The Okali-led affirmative action plan died quickly, Akeyasu and his cohorts 
began eating, and the Defense Counsel list currently includes Nicolas Tiangaye of the 
Central African Republic, Patrice Monthe of Cameroon, Johan Scheers of Belgium, and 
David Hooper for the United Kingdom. The ICTR however, never truly recovered from 
this piercing loss of legitimacy.  
  Within such a small tribunal such as the ICTR, there is generally very little room 
for mistakes of great significance. Certainly no defendant has ever been without counsel 
as a result of a clerical error, as has happened frequently in United States courts, and 
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continues to this day. With only fifty-five defendants and twenty-one of the most skilled 
legal scholars in the world as Judges, mistakes are few and far between. Questions, if 
they arise, are usually constrained to the law. The crux of this paper is where these two 
issues collide, the right to counsel as a matter of law, and how far it comparably stretches 
within the political practices of the ICTR adversely effected the Trial of Jean Kambanda.  
 In most nations which involve an appointed counsel system, (the United States 
and the United Kingdom for example), the indigent defendant may not pick and choose 
his attorney.lxxiii He may discharge an attorney at his own behest, but the arbitrary 
selection of defense counsel is prohibited. These concerns generally arise within the 
context of an indigent defendant vociferously (but perhaps not unreasonably) requesting a 
counsel of his own race. An indigent defendant generally has no right to a certain 
counsel, but simply counsel in and of himself.lxxiv In that respect, the ICTR differs from 
the norm. An indigent defendant personally selects his or her own lawyer from a list of 
several hundred highly qualified lawyers representing the major legal systems of the 
world.lxxv It is then the Registrar’s determination whether or not the selection will be 
appointed.  
 This departure from the norm has led to some legal confusion. Jean Paul Akeyasu, 
a teacher and convicted genocidal leader, selected a counsel from the list which was not 
granted. On appeal, he argued that his denial of specific counsel was tantamount to denial 
of counsel in it’s entirety. This logic was dealt with at length by the appellate chamber, 
holding that a balance must be struck between a defendant’s “right to counsel of his own 
choosing” and tribunal resources.lxxvi The court held that an indigent defendant has no 
right to “specific counsel” despite the choice implied in selection, but rather is only 
entitled to counsel in it’s most general meaning.  
4. Jean Kambanda’s Counsel. 
 
 The context in which counsel was finally appointed to Jean Kambanda are 
complex. Following his arrest in July and for the nine months following, Jean Kambanda 
communicated to the Registry that he did not seek legal counsel, though he would request 
it if it became truly necessary. The decision to proceed pro persona, within the vast body 
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of criminal law, is a weighty one and almost always recorded within the trial transcript. 
Certainty when an attorney is involved in a limited sense, as here, the decision to proceed 
pro persona raises several attorney duties independent of the client’s wishes.lxxvii Indeed, 
in many countries including the United States, a decision to proceed pro per must be 
acknowledged by the court at the outset.lxxviii The ICTR has a similar procedure known as 
“Renonciation temporaire au droit à l’assistance d’un conseil de la defense,” literally 
translated a “Temporary Renunciation of the Right of Assistance of Counsel. This 
document Kambanda signed following a communication to the Register in October, but is 
not noted in the Trial Court opinion.lxxix  
 
 Given the relative important of a pro per decision, one might imagine it would be 
duly recorded. Yet in Trial Chamber judgment it is completely ignored. There is no legal, 
nor practical explanation of this oversight. Indeed, if one were to simply read the opinion, 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to infer that Jean Kambanda had appeared not 
once, but twice before the ICTR pro per, and had signed a waiver of counsel rights. The 
entire procedural history as redacted by Judge Kama contains no hint of the lack of 
counsel;  
 
 1. Jean Kambanda was arrested by the Kenyan authorities,…on 9 July 1997…  
 On 16 July 1997, Judge Laïty Kama, …ordered the transfer and provisional 
 detention of the suspect Jean Kambanda at the Detention Facility of the Tribunal 
 for a period of thirty days, pursuant to Rule 40 bis of the Rules. … 
 2. On 16 October 1997, an indictment against the suspect Jean Kambanda, 
 prepared by the Office of the Prosecutor, was submitted to Judge Yakov 
 Ostrovsky, who confirmed it, issued a warrant of arrest against the accused and 
 ordered his continued detention. 
 3. On 1 May 1998, during his initial appearance before this Trial Chamber, the 
 accused pleaded guilty to the six counts contained in the indictment, …lxxx 
 This could, potentially be explained away if a pro per decision is recorded at some 
later stage in the opinion. However  in the entire judgment of the Trial Chamber, the 
decision to proceed pro per is never recorded, and Kambanda’s objections to the new 
counsel never noted. The Trial Chamber, records only a short discussion of Kambanda’s 
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“unequivocallness” of his “guilty plea”. As Professor Russell-Brown noted in her 
discussion of Kajelijeli, for almost 147 days Kajelijeli was without counsel in flagrant 
violation of international law.lxxxi Consider then, that Jean Kambanda, perhaps the most 
culpable of defendants, was without counsel for almost four months !  
 
  The appeals chamber, in stark contrast stated; 
 
 Between 18 July 1997, the date of his arrest, and March 1998, the Appellant did 
 not wish to be represented by counsel, reserving his right to such assistance until 
 he expressly said that he felt it necessary. On 11 August 1997, in a letter to 
 the Registry, he declared that he wished to waive his right to be represented by 
 counsel, which waiver he confirmed verbally during the Trial Chamber hearings 
 on 14 August and 16 September 1997. On 18 October 1997, the Appellant 
 submitted a document entitled "Renonciation temporaire au droit à l’assistance 
 d’un conseil de la défense" (Temporary Waiver of My Right to Defence Counsel), 
 in which he once again confirmed his waiver in writing.lxxxii 
 
 The appeals chamber further noted that following the plea agreement, he appeared 
before the chamber three times without assistance of counsel, totaling five times he had 
appeared pro per before the Trial chamber.   
 
 Throughout this process, Kambanda alleged that though he repeatedly requested 
Counsel Sheers,lxxxiii and the Registry insisted upon assigning him a little known 
Cameroonian Defense Counsel named Oliver Michael Inglis.lxxxiv Little information is 
available regarding his selection, though in a later appellate opinion Kambanda would 
allege that Inglis, a Cameroonian Defense counsel, had been a friend of the Deputy 
Prosecutor for over thirty years.lxxxv It was under Inglis’s counsel that Kambanda pled 
guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment, the most severe punishment the ICTR 
may confer.  
 
5. Jean Kambana’s Plea – The Trouble with Inglis.  
 
a. The Plea.  
 
 A plea of guilty in the ICTR is generally considered a mitigating circumstance for 
the purposes of sentencing.lxxxvi A rapid plea of guilty at the outset of litigation, which 
gives no inference of strategy by the accused to secure the “best of a bad situation” is 
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considered even more mitigating.lxxxvii Indeed, in many instances such a plea might be 
one of the final shreds of hope for an ICTR defendant. The ICTR has, after all, far out 
shadowed its predecessor the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in severe 
sentences.lxxxviii More practically the Rwandan Gacaca courts (domestic tribal versions of 
the ICTR), found that a rapid guilty plea within the context of genocide ameliorates the 
obviously abrasive racial environment, as well as overcoming evidence problems in the 
post-genocide era.lxxxix  
 
 Eulogies of guilty plea’s aside, the western procedure of pleading guilty has long 
been criticized in domestic academe as inept and dictatorial.xc Such claims rise to a new 
level of severity when litigated in the context of elite legal fora, such as the ICTR. Pleas 
in international law are of far greater import, and their effects upon sentencing more 
profound than in the domestic arena. As aforementioned, a swift and painless guilty plea 
may be the last weapon a defendant has against the scathing wrath of an angry chambers.  
 
 Rule 62 of ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence governs the legal sanctity of 
pleas.xci It parallels the general school of thought regarding pleas, which hold that for a 
plea to survive appellate review, it must be free and voluntary, unequivocal, informed, 
and based on sufficient facts. This four pronged test requires each element to verified in 
open court by the Trial Chambers, through a semi-interrogative questioning by the 
Chamber Judges. This verification is outlined in Rule 62(v),xcii and was carried out in 
Jean Kambanda’s trial, but also notably in the plea of Omar Serushago, the violent 
Interahamwe squad leader in Gisenyi.xciii .  
 
 The plea of Jean Kambanda, as opined by the trial court, was verified by Judge 
Kama.xciv Though descriptive of the questions and affirmative answers, no explicit 
language save the Trial Court’s actual verdict of “guilty” was mentioned in the opinion. 
The courts complete discussion of the incident consists of the following; 
 The Chamber, nevertheless, sought to verify the validity of the guilty plea. To this 
 end, the Chamber asked the accused: 
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  (i) if his guilty plea was entered voluntarily, in other words, if he did so  
  freely and knowingly, without pressure, threats, or promises; 
  (ii) if he clearly understood the charges against him as well as the   
  consequences of his guilty plea; and 
  (iii) if his guilty plea was unequivocal, in other words, if he was aware  
  that the said plea could not be refuted by any line of defence.  
  7. The accused replied in the affirmative to all these questions. On the  
  strength of these answers, the Chamber delivered its decision from the  
  bench as follows: 
  "Mr. Jean Kambanda, having deliberated and after verifying that your  
  plea of guilty is voluntary, unequivocal and that you clearly understand its 
  terms and consequences,…xcv 
 
 So far, so good. Little dispute exists over a recorded interrogation by the eminent 
jurist Laity Kama.xcvi  Justice Kama goes on to discuss some of the underlying principles 
of international law, and the statutory framework of the tribunal, before beginning to 
discuss the case in earnest.xcvii The crux of this paper emerges when Laity Kama begins to 
discuss the plea agreement and affidavit signed by Kambanda and his Counsel Inglis. The 
Trial records that this document entitled “Plea Agreement between Jean Kambanda and 
the OTP” was signed on April 28th 1998.xcviii However, the Appeals Judgment notes that, 
at the earliest, Kambanda did not have ANY counsel until the 25th of March, 1998,xcix 
only thirty-four days before the plea agreement was signed, and just twenty-four working 
days before the plea agreement was signed with Counsel Inglis. Thus Jean Kambanda not 
only agreed to a plea stratagem (which was obviously unsuccessful), assembled a plea 
agreement, and conducted relatively complex crisis bargaining having a lawyer for the 
grand total of less than four weeks.  
 
 On the 4th of September 1998, just six months after he had been appointed 
counsel, Jean Kambanda was sentenced to life in prison by a unanimous panel of Judge 
Laity Kama, Judge Lennart Aspegren, and Judge Navanethem Pillay.  
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b.  The Trouble with Inglis.  
 
 This paper does not dwell upon the strategic and tactical inadequacies of Counsel 
Inglis’ crisis bargaining. Whether Inglis was simply confused the day he signed an 
Affidavit condemning his client to die in prison, or malicious, is irrelevant. The core 
issue is that Kambanda’s appointed Defense counsel signed an affidavit which proved the 
Prosecution’s case. Among the more damning things the affidavit discussed were relived 
by Judge Kama in his opinion; 
 
 Jean Kambanda acknowledges that as Prime Minister of the Interim Government 
 of Rwanda from 8 April 1994 to 17 July 1994, he…exercised de jure and de facto 
 authority over senior civil servants and senior officers in the military…c 
 
 Jean Kambanda acknowledges that on 3 May 1994, he was personally asked to 
 take steps to protect children who had survived the massacre at a hospital and he 
 did not respond. On the same day, after the meeting, the children were killed. He 
 acknowledges that he failed in his duty to ensure the safety of the children and the 
 population of Rwanda…ci 
 
 Both of these affirmations indicate that Kambanda and his Counsel not only 
agreed to factual conclusions but legal conclusions as well. Counsel Inglis essentially 
allowed the Prosecutor to prove their case before it began. For example, the legal 
conclusion of de jure and de facto authority, by its very nature, is an incredibly complex 
litigation and not one which can be sidestepped at the outset by a mere signed document. 
Yet Inglis’s damage was far from done.  
 
 In the Pre-sentencing transcript of Jean Kambanda, the Trial Prosecutor stated 
clearly that “We  believe that this offence merits nothing less than the maximum, 
maximum punishment”.cii The keystone of the Prosecutor’s argument was the damning 
admissions made by Jean Kambanda in his affidavit. However following direct 
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questioning by Judge Muna into the Accused’s cooperative nature  the Prosecutor 
responded to interrogation with a startling admission; 
 
 “ JUDGE PILLAY: My interest is not what he told you in confidence or what 
 your informers told you. I am interested in whether the accused made any public 
 statement speaking out on the truth of the events in Rwanda. 
  
            MR. MUNA: Not to my knowledge, not to my knowledge,  Your  Honour.” 
 
 Thus the senior prosecutor, responsible for eulogizing Kambanda’s cooperation 
and admissions, was unable to cite any public statements by Kambanda to that effect.   
To complicate matters further, Counsel Inglis’s own pre-sentencing statements dwelled 
upon myriad factors which, if not for his preliminary admission of guilty, might well 
have functioned as affirmative defenses. Inglis’ argument that Kambanda may have been 
coerced to become Prime Minister, and was continually surrounded by a vanguard of 
armed Defense ministry bodyguards isolating him from private contact, might have 
played well in a Trial setting.ciii Yet this directly contradicted the affirmation which Inglis 
himself had signed. Thus the confused Chambers were, on the one hand, confronted with 
a signed affidavit indicating de jure authority but simultaneously met with Counsel Inglis 
counter-vailing argument of coercion.  
 
 In the most bizarre of his statements, Inglis began quoting laudatory letters from 
genocide survivors, including a self-stylized fan who was “a collector on  autographs of 
persons who really have done something positive for their people and the future of 
mankind.” The most frank determination of Counsel Inglis’s obvious inept manner may 
be had from a short transcript of the first question Judge Pillay asked of him; 
 
 JUDGE PILLAY: Mr. Inglis, you refer in your brief to a document that you say 
 the accused wrote  in November,1995, in Nairobi. 
  
      MR. INGLIS: Pardon? 
  
 JUDGE PILLAY: I am referring to your brief. 
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 MR. INGLIS: Yes? 
  
 JUDGE PILLAY: In which you are-- make mention of a document written by the 
 accused in November'95 you say called-- well it is a document about peace and 
 reconciliation in Rwanda. Do you know that? It is in your brief here, I am 
 referring to-- do you want  the page, page 4? 
  
 MR. INGLIS: Yes. 
  
 JUDGE PILLAY: But you didn't puts up this document and  you don't tell us 
 anything about the contents of that document, and you don't tell us why the 
 Chamber should somehow take that into  consideration as mitigatory  so if 
 we don't know, if we don't know the contents of the documents, we can only 
 speculate on its contents.  It may be another--  is it another plan for genocide or is 
 it some exciting plan for peace? So if you are a position can you tell us, give us 
 some idea of what the accused's positionis with regards to peace and 
 reconciliationin Rwanda and how-- and whether he sees anyrole for himself in the 
 process of peace and reconciliation in Rwanda? 
  
 MR. INGLIS: What role he played? 
  
            JUDGE PILLAY: So that's my one question in relation to this document and the 
 accused's thoughts on peace and reconciliation in Rwanda and whether he sees 
 any role  for himself in that? So that's the one part of my question  and the other 
 is can you explain how a prison sentence of 2 years is going to help the healing 
 process? 
  
 
 As the pre-sentencing hearing progressed, it became apparent that Counsel Inglis 
was defending Kambanda through allegations of coercion and a “puppet” government. 
However defense in a pre-sentencing hearing is to no avail. Having been convicted of 
genocide, Kambanda was in a position analogous to that of an In-Custody Felony 
Defendant in a California Arraignment (Where the Judge must, without regard to 
defenses or allegations, assume the crime is true). Affirmative defenses or pleas of 
diminished capacity are extraneous in a pre-sentencing hearing. Yet Inglis had one final 
card up his sleeve. 
 
 In a final surreal, if not Charles Dodson-esque bit of advocacy,civ Counsel Inglis 
cited the Ugandan Penal Code. The crux of his argument was that if Uganda mitigated 
capital punishments to five years, and life imprisonment to two years, could not the ICTR 
accept the same rationale ? Thus Inglis implicitly argued that Kambanda could, plausibly, 
receive the same punishment for multiple genocide convictions as if he sold 16 ounces of 
marijuana in Salt Lake City, Utah.cv Consider the obviously estranged statement; 
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 The case now before your Trial Chamber is repeat [replete] with mitigating 
 factors that tell in favour of a sentence of two years, two years imprisonment, if          
 you follow the general practice regarding prison sentences in Rwanda in the 
 interest of justice and with a view to reconciliation among the people 
 
 This statement, which found it’s basis in Article 83 of the Ugandan Penal Code,  
neglected to mention that Uganda was not replete (forgive the pun) with judicial 
legitimacy itself. Having survived it’s own horrific genocide at the hands of Idi Amin, 
and led by the dictator-President Lt. Gen. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (who appoints the 
entire judiciary), Uganda’s legal system would, in the layman’s view, have been a 
second-string choice for citation in a pre-sentencing hearing on genocide.  
 
 Kambanda’s plea was accepted. The Trial Court, sentenced Kambanda to life 
imprisonment on the 4th of September 1998, six years ago.  
 
6. The Appeal. 
 
a.  Prelude. 
 
 Four days after sentence was passed, Kambanda filed a notice of appeal through 
his erstwhile Counsel Inglis.cvi Four days after this notice, Kambanda applied to dismiss 
Inglis, and change his defense counsel.cvii At some point later, (the appeals judgment is 
unclear) Counsel was substituted, and Kambanda was appointed a new defense counsel in 
the form of Tjarda Eduard van der Spoel and Gerard Mols, both experienced attorneys 
who has since appeared in both the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia. Within weeks a solidified appeal was lodged, alleging incompetence of 
counsel, denial of the right to counsel, and a motion to set aside the plea of guilty and 
request a new trial.  
 
 At the outset, it appeared that Tjarda van der Spoel was undoubtedly a more 
expert counsel.cviii Unlike the rather passive Mr. Inglis, whose ill fated plea bargain led to 
Kambanda’s life sentence, Tjarda Van der Spoel proved a different animal. Van Der 
 26 
Spoel’s defense team immediately began appellate skirmishes with the Prosecutors, 
supplanting motions with further motions eventually running into the hundreds of pages. 
There were, the appellate court noted with a twinge of chagrin, appendices to motions 
which ran into the hundreds of pages.cix These appendices were, of course, met with equal 
literary vehemence by the Prosecutor’s office, which began a campaign to bolster the 
Kambanda judgment. At a certain point, there were three reply’s to a single document, a 
treatise awkwardly entitled A “Reply to the Prosecutor’s Response on the Appellant’s 
Brief of 2nd of May 2000”.cx  
 
 In the final analysis, Kamanda’s eight count appeal of the Trial Court Judgment 
was an indictment of the ICTR itself. In the brief span of three pages, Van der Spoel 
argued that the Trial Chamber denied Kambanda his right to counsel, did not investigate 
the plea thoroughly, based the plea itself on an insufficient factual basis, illegally 
detained Kambanda outside the Arusha complex, and failed whatsoever to analyze the 
guilty plea as a mitigating circumstance.cxi  The crux of this appeal revolved around Inglis 
and the Trial Chamber itself. Van der Spoel’s appeal was a condemnation of the 
proceedings and a blunt analogy to the Trial Chamber of the ICTR as a politically 
motivated lynch-mob. Van der Spoel harped upon the right to counsel, arguing that the 
Registry denied him the right to Counsel Sheers, intentionally substituting the inept 
Inglis.  
 
 The severity of the allegations were such that the Prosecution itself filed an 
Objection to the right-to-counsel arguments,cxii and the Registry (in an unprecedented and 
subjective amicus) filed a “Reply” against Van der Spoel’s allegations.cxiii Never in the 
history of the ICTR had the Registry sought to intervene in the Criminal process, and it 
has never sought intervention since. Van der Spoel’s allegations threatened Registrar 
Okali’s very legitimacy, and sensing his own power was becoming suspect, Okali lashed 
out as only a threatened tyrant can.  Okali’s own legal vanguard actually moved the 
Appeals Chamber to dismiss Kambanda’s case on the basis that appointment of a counsel 
is not an justiciable legal stance.cxiv This legal posture and presence, unheard of in 
modern international law, continues to undermine the Registers own objectivity. Okali, 
 27 
inept himself, also created an embarrassing situation again by appearing highly subjective 
in his ostensibly non-legal position. The entire affair was equivalent to a Federal Court 
Clerk functioning as an ex officio state amicus for a United States Attorney.  
 
 In October of 2000, many replies, counter-replies, and objections later,  the 
appeals court under the deific figure of Justice Jorda,cxv disposed of the appeals grounds 
and affirmed the judgment of the Trial court. Citing a host of documents including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, Justice Jorda stated “the right 
to free legal assistance by counsel does not confer the right to choose one’s counsel.”  
 
b. The Mistake. 
 
 The critical error in Van der Spoel’s argument was his failure to base Inglis’ 
incompetence as an independent ground of appeal. The inadequacy and incompetence of 
Counsel Inglis received remarks only in passing. Though the incompetence was noted 
and implicitly argued as tantamount to legal denial of counsel, Justice Jorda’s masterful 
writing disposed of Inglis’ behavior, ruling on the appeal as a matter of law, without 
dwelling on facts. Justice Jorda legally and elegantly sidestepped the painful task of 
cutting apart Counsel Inglis and granting Kambanda the new trial to which he was 
obviously entitled. Without a full argument that Counsel Inglis was incompetent, and 
only an argument that Kambanda was denied his right to a specific counsel Jorda opined; 
 
 …in the Appellant’s briefs and oral statements the problem of his counsel’s 
 inadequacy never figured as an argument, let alone an independent ground of 
 appeal [emphasis added]. The Appellant’s allegations on this point are at the very 
 least confused. It is true that in his statement the Appellant did cite, for example, 
 the insufficient number of meetings with his counsel and the latter’s lack of 
 interest in and knowledge of the case file[40]. The Appeals Chamber nevertheless 
 finds that the Appellant has not succeeded in showing his Counsel to be 
 incompetent on the basis of solid arguments and relevant facts [emphasis 
 added]. Rather, the Chamber has before it documents proving that counsel for the 
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 Appellant carried out the functions of his office in the normal manner[citation 
 omitted]. The  Appeals Chamber therefore cannot accept the Appellant’s 
 allegations and concludes that he has not been able to demonstrate the existence 
 of special circumstances capable of constituting an exception to the waiver 
 principle. 
 
c. Strategy and Politics. 
 
 There is no right to a “specific counsel” in any context. If Van der Spoel had 
argued that Kambanda had no counsel, or that Inglis’s incompetence had deprived him 
utterly of counsel, Jorda would have been forced to confront Inglis’s inadequacy and 
enter into a de novo factual determination. However, by arguing a specific right to a 
specific counsel,cxvi Jorda was able to eradicate Van der Spoel’s best argument as a matter 
of law, and not of substantive facts. Van der Spoel committed the strategic error of 
allowing Justice Jorda to fight on the ground of his own choosing. By placing the 
appellate battlefield in theoretical international law, Van der Spoel, despite his brilliance, 
was outgunned.cxvii  
 
 With the bulwark of Van der Spoel’s arguments destroyed, the backbone of the 
appeal began to break. The secondary grounds of unlawful detention and invalidity of the 
guilty plea, were all premised upon the central argument of lack of a specific counsel  
(Kambanda was denied his specific counsel, therefore his plea could not have been 
informed, or voluntary). Jorda’s succinct disposal of the central premise broke Van der 
Spoel’s charge. By allowing Jorda to take ‘the high ground’ and eradicate his central 
argument as a matter of law, Van der Spoel’s secondary arguments, powerful though they 
were, could not stand up to Jorda’s eviscerating scrutiny. Van der Spoel’s argument was 
premised in facts, not the law. Jorda’s opinion was entirely the law, dwelling sporadically 
on facts.  
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7. The Clash in Counsel Rights. 
 
a. The United States vs. The ICTR. 
 
  Thomas Jefferson once cribbed a quote from the “Tryal of Stafford”. Writing 
with a Virginian’s intellectual disdain for all things north of Charlottesville, Jefferson  
sarcastically noted the common (Yankee?) Judge’s moyens as  boni judicis est ampliare 
jurisdictionem, or ‘good justice is broad jurisdiction’.cxviii Jefferson, was stalwart in his 
distrust of the “despotic” judiciary and vehement in his belief that political corruption 
rendered it vulnerable to dictatorial tendencies.cxix His fears were echoed by many 
philosophers, both ancient and modern. In the mid 19th century William Carpenter wrote 
of the inhumanity of the Chancery Court,cxx while Jefferson’s paradigm of vulnerability 
was obviously drawn from Hobbes overarching disdain for most things human and 
culpable…particular judges.cxxi  Sadly, it seems that, at least in the international arena, 
some of this distrust is not unfounded.  
 
 Would the plea of Jean Kambanda be accepted in the United States ? In the 
United States the Strickland v. Washington rule, holds that the right to counsel is 
synonymous with the right to a competent counsel.cxxii  But despite the existence of this 
claim, U.S. courts are loath to dwell upon the trial behavior of attorneys. In American 
jurisprudence, one may go extremely far before having the scarlet letter of 
“incompetence” emblazoned upon an attorney’s coattails. The courts have upheld the 
sanctity of a proceeding where counsels has become progressively deaf and blind,cxxiii 
visibly intoxicated and reeking of alcohol,cxxiv and in one bizarre case arising from 
Jackson v. State, where Counsel had in fact “been so overwhelmed and discomfited by his 
own inept performance that he was "driven into an infantile hysterical tantrum which 
was tantamount to a disturbed child eluding a bully but exclaiming his humiliation while 
doing so [he] climaxed his unskilful performance with a serious series of ambidexterous 
arm swings and an audible rhythmical cresendo [sic] of, (quote) 'Fiddle Sticks, Awe 
Poot'.”cxxv Inglis performance would have been accepted as sub-par, but perhaps a U.S. 
Appeals court would also have determined incompetence.   
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 Could Inglis’s performance be some sort of strategic gamble ? Unfortunately, an 
argument that Inglis was attempting to spare Kambanda the threat of multiple life 
sentences is inadequate. The ICTR is not a domestic court. The forlorn hope of Parole is 
in vain. If Kambanda was to receive one life sentence, his punishment would be identical 
to a sentence of  forty life sentences. Similarly, why would Inglis rely solely on the guilty 
plea as the chief grounds of mitigation. In the case of Gérard Ntakirutimana, a trial 
convicted Genocidaire and murderer, the Trial Chamber sentenced him to a mitigated 
punishment of twenty-five years.cxxvi Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian who plead guilty to 
incitement to genocide was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 12 years.cxxvii Both 
Ruggiu and Ntakirutimana had substantial mitigatory facts, including character evidence, 
youth, and families. While gambles are prevalent in United States courts, they are 
infrequent in the context of the ICTR, where stakes are far greater.  
 
 Rationally, if Jean Kambanda was already facing life-imprisonment, what did he 
have to lose by pleading not guilty ? Judge Kama of the Trial Chamber noted with 
substantial sarcasm that “Both Counsel for Prosecution and Defence have urged the 
Chamber to interpret Jean Kambanda’s guilty pleas as a signal of his remorse, 
repentance and acceptance of responsibility for his actions. The Chamber is mindful that 
remorse is not the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from a guilty plea.” This 
would indicate that even with an inference of remorse and repentance, there was no 
significant advantage to pleading guilty at the outset…might Kambanda have been better 
off in a trial ?  
 
 Unfortunately for comparison, this is precisely the sort of “second-guessing” U.S. 
Courts are strenuously opposed too. While severe sixth amendment infractions will result 
in appellate reversal, it is an infrequent judge who will depart from the norm, and enter 
into the mind of a trial lawyer to determine adequacy. A presumption of competence 
pervades Sixth amendment jurisprudence,cxxviii and as discussed at length in the American 
Jurisprudence Trials Encyclopedia, there is a veritable plethora of errors which did not 
result in reversal.cxxix 
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b. The Final Analysis. 
 
 In the Book of Genesis, Abraham is instructed by God to make a sacrifice of his 
only son Issac, as a symbolic gesture of his faith.cxxx Recognizing that only through the 
purest sacrifice could both faith and Abraham’s own resolve be secured, the Almighty 
duped the Prophet into securing a lasting connection between the Heavens and himself. In 
the same vein, Kambanda became the Issac of an unforgiving political climate. His 
unsuccessful appeal was a direct result of the need for a sacrificial lamb to calm the rising 
tide of Rwandan intransigence and United Nations angst.  It was Kambanda himself who 
foresaw his own seemingly sacrificial position in a letter to the Registry; 
 
 …permit me to cast doubt over certain practices surrounding my trial and the 
 illusion that some people seem to entertain of having found the sacrificial lamb 
 which will erase the responsibilities of others in the extermination of the Rwandan 
 people… 
 
  Both Judge Laity Kama and Justice Claude Jorda were painfully cognizant of the 
fact that Jean Kambanda, despite his guilt or innocence, symbolized the genocide. 
However innocent in the eyes of the law Kambanda might be, however inept and 
deplorable his Counsel’s conduct was, Jean Kambanda’s face had become intransigently 
imbedded in the Rwandan psyche. A swift and brutal punishment would undoubtedly 
provide closure to the thousands of victims of genocide in Rwanda, allowing the country 
to take a large step forward toward healing and reconciliation. This brutal but effective 
paradigm of symbolism, is prevalent in history and philosophy. The symbol of violence is 
destroyed at the behest of the kind master. Indeed, political philosopher Niccolo 
Machiavelli noted this rationale in his treatise “The Prince” concerning the execution of 
violent Baron Ramiro d'Orco.cxxxi Both Kama and Jorda, exquisitely trained scholars of 
law and history would recognize this analogy and the implications of offering up 
Kambanda to the bloodthirsty masses.  
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 Kama and Jorda were also cognizant of a more pressing threat. Since 1999, the 
Rwandan people’s dissatisfaction with the ICTR has manifested itself in political 
intransigence, protests, and even criticism from the United Nations and abroad.cxxxii  In 
November of 1999, several months before the appeal, a peaceful assembly of genocide 
survivors had implanted itself outside the diminutive ICTR facility, and protested the 
release of Attorney Barayagwiza, a genocidal colleague of Kambanda. Rwanda itself had 
refused to appear at the United Nations General Assembly until the Barayagwiza issue 
was resolved, and had suspended all cooperation with the ICTR forthwith.cxxxiii  
 
 At the outset of the ICTR venture, relations between Kigali and the UN’s judicial 
forward base were tenuous. Kambanda was ostensibly caught between a Gargantua and 
Pantagruel-esque combat. The Rwandan people had long been amazed at the arrogance  
of the United Nation’s intervention in their judicial process. It was UN Secretary General 
Annan who had refused to augment troops in a last effort to stem the beginnings of the 
genocide.cxxxiv Despite the last minute valiant efforts of UN peacekeeper General Romeo 
Dallaire, and 500 of his troops, it was the United Nations which allowed the mass 
slaughter of innocent men women and children.cxxxv  
 
 In order to preserve and strengthen the ties between the UN ICTR, and the 
government of Rwanda, and regain the legitimacy they had lost, the Court needed a 
sacrifice. Like Issac, blood needed to be spilt in order to preserve what justice was left. 
The Prime Minister of Rwanda, a highly recognizable face and symbol of the genocide, 
seems perfect to portray as the ICTR’s piece de resistance…and a clear symbol that the 
ICTR was “on the side of Rwanda”. 
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8. Conclusion:  
 
 At the close of many scholarly essays and law review articles, it behooves the 
researcher to dwell upon the greater implications of his research. Many authors choose at 
this juncture to discuss the ramifications of their thesis upon a field of law. Like a 
student’s stone cast into a pond of jurisprudence, these authors write of their ripples upon 
the face of the water. Other writers seek to critique the state of the law, and instead 
choose to discuss the pond in it’s entirety. Still others disregard the pond and the water, 
and instead delve deep into the heart of their thesis, and analyze the stone. 
 
 This layman researcher feels there can be no joy in any of these tasks. He 
concludes, with some sadness, that Jean Kambanda deserves to remain where he is. 
Sacrificial though Kambanda’s fate might seem, the suffering to the people of Rwanda 
should it’s injuries be reopened, and her healing wrenched to a halt, would be too 
destructive to bear. Too many good men have perished in an effort to halt or heal the 
troubles of Rwanda, to allow it’s anguish to resurface. This troubled land where the 
peaceful Pygmy Twa once walked, where the last remaining mountain gorillas scatter 
amidst gunfire, and orphaned children with bodies torn and mangled by explosives, play 
in the street, has endured enough. 
 
 Kambanda is, of course, not innocent. Inconsistencies and politics aside, as a 
matter of natural justice, he undoubtedly belongs in prison. But as many a Public 
Defender might say, “Is this truly the way to go about it ?” Perhaps there is an alternative 
route which neither hurts Rwanda, nor sacrifices the natural justice of Jean Kambanda. 
Yet in the final analysis, it would take greater minds than I to imagine it.  
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 The small man sits on the edge of his bed. His dark skin and orange jumpsuit are   
  
 searing against the white starched walls of his small cell. Back hunched, eyes  
 
 downcast, almost closed, hands on his knees. It is impossible to tell whether he is  
 
 asleep, meditating, or merely waiting. The fluorescent tube-light above him  
 
 buzzes and snaps, and his fingers remove the black plastic eyeglasses and  
 
 massage his tired temples. A bell sounds and the lights in his hallway shut off with  
 
 a thump of steel. Jean Kambanda does not move as he is plunged into darkness.  
 
  
 
 
 His eyes close on his 1,825th day.  
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